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 This thesis deals with the United States perception of Simón Bolívar, the liberator 
of six South American republics.  Heralded today as a hero, in his lifetime, Bolívar 
endured a barrage of criticism from United States diplomats and other public figures who 
saw him as power hungry and monarchical in his designs. Diplomatic correspondences, 
congressional debates, personal memoirs, and press articles during the years 1811 to 1831 
reveal the origins of these views of the Liberator.  The sources demonstrated that people 
in the United States failed to understand Bolívar’s actions or motives as a military and 
political leader in northern South America.  At first these North Americans saw Bolívar 
embracing United States style of republicanism and following George Washington’s 
example of peacefully giving up power in the interests of the republic.  Critics began to 
suspect Bolívar as having imperial ambitions and lusting for power, the very antithesis of 
Washington.  Only Bolívar’s public resignation from his position of power silenced these 
critics.  As important, some public figures never abandoned their positive view of 
Bolívar.  Certainly President Andrew Jackson saw him as a model of republicanism, a 
sentiment that ultimately prevailed in the United States. 
 During the development of relations between North and South America, new 
racial ideologies emerged in the United States.  The notion of innate racial differences 
and natural superiority of white United States citizens profoundly shaped the image many 
in the United States held of South Americans.  Those who embraced the innate 
superiority of white North Americans in the United States saw their South America 
iv 
neighbors as lacking the necessary characteristics for an effective republic. The 
increasingly hostile opinions of Bolívar corresponded with a rising sense of the natural 
superiority of the U.S. embodied in the notion of descending from Anglo-Saxons.  The 
lens of republicanism, notions of race, and perceptions of a model government help us 
capture how the young republic of the United States interpreted the development of 





























“The seed of liberty yields its just fruit.  If there is anything which is never lost, it is the 
blood which is shed for a deserving cause.”1 
- Simón Bolívar 
  
                                                            
1As quoted in Arthur Bullard, Panama, the Canal, the Country, and the People (New 
York, NY: The MacMillan Company, 1912), 373. 
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 The American Revolution against England spawned a series of independence 
movements which engaged the majority of the Atlantic World over a fifty-year period.  
Simón Bolívar emerged as the most controversial hero from these wars.  He envisioned a 
unified South America under one form of government.  Along with the U.S., he desired a 
hemisphere of liberty with strong republics free from Spain.2  He and other South 
American leaders looked first to the United States as a guide to establish 
republics.3Bolívar later turned to European forms of government as models for the 
republican states in South America.  His preference for a democratic monarchy – similar 
to Great Britain’sconstitutional monarchy –produced a great deal of tension within 
hemispheric relations.The United States failed to understand a man such as Bolívar.4  He 
was a complicated individual whose philosophies and wordswere sometimes inconsistent 
with his actions.  John Lynch, a Latin American historian and Bolívar biographer, 
described Bolívar as “an exceptionally complex man, a liberator who scorned liberalism, 
                                                            
2 John J. Johnson, A Hemisphere Apart: The Foundations of Untied States Policy toward 
Latin America (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 81. 
3“LibertadorPresidente al Encargado de Negocios de los EstadosUnidos de América, 
Lima, 16 Noviembre 1826” in Simón Bolívar, ObrasCompletas (Caracas, D.F.: E. 
Requena Mira, 1963), vol. III, 776. 
4 When I refer to the United States throughout this work, I refer to both the government 
and the public.  The press published many of the dispatches to and speeches in 
Washington.  Often the author, receiver, or note-taker of such articles sent an editor a 




a soldier who disparaged militarism, a republican who admired monarchy.”5The United 
States viewed Bolívar as embracingits model of republicanism and following George 
Washington’s peaceful surrender of power in the interests of the republic.  Many in the 
U.S. soon regretted this position as they interpreted Bolívar’s actions as contrary to the 
spirit of republicanism and Washington.  This shift in public opinion occurred as ideas of 
racial distinctions and of racial superiority developed within the United States.  These 
cast South Americans in an inferior light and, therefore, incapable of building a republic 
comparable to the one found in the United States. 
Diplomats, business partners, family, and unnamed informants provided the 
opinions of Bolívar and his policies. These views eventually reached the public via 
newspapers, magazines, and other media outlets.  Public reaction varied depending on the 
region and specific social groups; however, fashioning a singular view of the Liberator 
proves difficult given his complexity.  For the purpose of analysis, this study focuses on 
three aspects of U.S. comprehension of Bolívar.  First,the U.S. projecting itself as the 
republican model for South Americans shapes the reactions of U.S. officials to Bolívar.  
Next, for some in the U.S., Bolívar’s ambition for powerdrove him to seek a monarchy 
and empire.  These clearly undermined essential features of republicanism, i.e., rule by 
the people.  Such ambitions separated him from Washington who sought the peaceful 
interests of the republic through his resignation of power.  Concurrently,emergent racial 
ideologies within the United Statestrumpetedracialand natural superiority over Spanish 
                                                            





Americans.Religion would seem an obvious choice as well; however,during the time of 
Bolívar the focus remained on republican values and racial ideologies.6 
Though many have written about Bolívar, few have attempted to tackle U.S. 
opinion toward him.7  J. Fred Rippy looks at how U.S. diplomats viewed Bolívar during 
the last five years of his life and argues that the diplomats generally praised Bolívar until 
the South American patriots drove the Spaniards out of the region.  From 1826 on, U.S. 
agents began sending back negative reports to the government.  Rippy states that by 1829 
“the condemnation was almost unanimous.”8  In another article, David Sowell examines 
newspapers popular in the United States to demonstrate how the public interpreted 
Bolívar through a lens of republicanism.Sowell employs the term republicanism 
believing that since the U.S. had “few material or cultural achievements, the United 
States placed a high premium on its civic and political accomplishments.”9  Sowell writes 
that the U.S. population felt their form of government was the best in the world and all 
countries should adopt it.  He illustrates how the lens of republicanism formed the image 
of Bolívar in the United States especially during periods of disillusionment with Bolívar. 
In her dissertation, Caitlin Fitz combines republicanism and race as lenses through 
which the U.S. viewed Bolívar.10She writes that the U.S. supported the independence 
                                                            
6 Fredrick Pike, United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization 
and Nature (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992), 76-80. 
7 The first is J. Fred Rippy, “Bolívar as Viewed by Contemporary Diplomats of the 
United States,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 15, no. 3 (August 1935), 
287-297. The second is David Sowell, “The Mirror of Public Opinion: Bolívar, 
Republicanism and the United States Press, 1821-1831,” Revista de Historia de América, 
no. 134 (Jan. - June 2004), 165-183. 
8 Rippy, “Bolívar as Viewed by Contemporary Diplomats of the United States,” 287-288. 
9Sowell, “The Mirror of Public Opinion,” 167. 
10 Caitlin Fitz, Our Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American 




movements in South America due to a shared sense of republicanism.  Fitz argues that the 
U.S. did not define South Americans as racially distinct until the congressional debates 
on the Panama Congress in 1826when politicians usedracialized language to distinguish 
themselves from South American countries which had emancipated their slaves.  
Speeches from the congressional debates on the Panama Mission, spread by the press, 
influenced U.S. citizens who began to accept these racial distinctions.Fitz’s argument is 
congruent with Mark Jaede’s dissertationin which he argues that the Panama debates in 
Congress redefined how the United States observed racial differences between North and 
South Americans.11  Before the Panama question, the U.S. saw Spanish Americans as 
fellow republicans “despite reservations about Spanish Americans’ religion, culture, 
[and] racial makeup.”12 
The argument of the thesis contends thatthe United States saw itself as the model 
for South American independence, republican institutions, and the proper use of power. 
For most of Bolívar’s career, the U.S. saw him as the Washington of South America.  The 
year 1826 marked a turning point in views toward Bolívar.  As he maintained and 
consolidated his political powers, people in the U.S. disassociated Bolívar from 
Washington.  Racial issues concerning Spanish Americamaterialized during this period.  
While acknowledging the emergence of racial distinctions argued by Fitz and Jaede based 
on congressional debatesconcerning the Panama Congress of 1826,the thesis stresses that 
such views of racial differences and superiority developed over time in the United States, 
rather than at one moment.  These growing racial ideologies reached the height of public 
                                                            
11 Mark G. Jaede, Brothers at a Distance: Race, Religion, Culture and U.S. Views of 
Spanish America, 1800-1830.  State University of New York at Buffalo, 2001. 




attention in 1826 with the Panama Question and gained widespread acceptance by the 
1830s.This study concentrates on Bolívar and northern South America in which he 
operated rather than dealing with the cone of South America where San Martín and others 
played the critical roles of independence.  This permits me to tailor comments about 
northern Spanish Americans to Bolívar himself.  My research encompasses the years 
1811 to 1831 which coincides with Bolívar’s activities in South American history.   
The examination brings together diplomatic dispatches and newspaper 
articleswritten about Bolívar during his life.The sources– though intended forspecific 
audiences – help answer the question of how the generation after the founding fathers 
reacted to Bolívar within the broader context of international relations. The dispatches, 
which commented at length on Bolívar, also assisted politicians in forming and 
maintaining relations between the U.S. government and the new South American states. 
The newspapers informed the public with both opinions and facts – which were not 
consistently validated.  Both types of sources illustrate a United States thatperceiveditself 
as the model of republicanism, one in which leaders showeda disinterest in power, and an 
emerging ideology which argued racial superiority over the mixed races of Spanish 
America.  This ideology reinforced the positions on republicanism.  Additional sources 
include memoirs, personal correspondence, and eye-witness accounts of Bolívar’s 
Spanish America during the formative years of the South American republics.  Many of 
the correspondences between U.S. agents and the Secretary of State are found in William 
R. Manning’s Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the 
Independence of the Latin-American Nations.  Though published in 1925, it continues to 




newspapers, I focus onThe Niles’ Weekly Register, The Commercial Advertiser of New 
York, The Christian Advocate of Philadelphia, and The Daily National Intelligencer of 
Washington, D.C.  These newspapers were more accessible than others with many 
references to Bolívar.Though not the best sampling, many secondary sources about 
Bolívar contain references to newspapers less accessible for my research.  The 
dissertations of Fitz and Jaede – combined with the Register of Debates – providedata on 
racial tensions between the U.S. and Spanish America.  Their works influenced me to 
include race as a lens through which the United States defined Bolívar. 
The thesis intends to expand our understanding of a complex historical figure as 
Bolívar and how the U.S. interpreted him and his fellow Spanish Americans.  In 
accomplishing this task the study is divided into four chapters.  The first chapter provides 
a brief history of Bolívar and the independence movements in northern South America.  
This includes Bolívar’s views of the United States and how they changed over time.  The 
next chapter focuses on the U.S. perspective onSouth American independence, the 
creation of the Spanish American republics, and the question of recognition of these new 
republics.  This chaptershows how the United States viewed Bolívar during the years of 
1811 to 1825 identifying the South American patriots as fellow republicans and Bolívar 
as Washington.  Chapter 3 explores the shifts in opinions regardingBolívar in the U.S.as 
he consolidated power among the new northern republics between 1826 and 1830.  This 
period marked an era of disillusionment with Bolívar based on varying reports from 
informants to Washington and the press of his ambitions for building an empire and/or 
creating a South American monarchy.Optimistic views toward Bolívar recommenced 




persistentnegative reports on Bolívar from the press.This chapter contains Bolívar’s retort 
to reports that he was establishing a monarchy in South America. It also includes U.S. 
reaction to Bolívar’s final resignation from powerand hissudden death on the eve of self-
imposed exile. 
The final chapter tackles the development U.S. popular conceptions of racial 
distinctions arising in theearly nineteenth century.  I give a history of race theory in the 
U.S., a definition of the Black Legend, thegrowinglink of North American whites to a 
superior Anglo-Saxon race, and how pseudo-sciences changed the accepted theories on 
race to one of racial distinction and superiority.  The language found in correspondences, 
political debates, and newspapers illustrate anincreasing sense of superiority over the 
racially mixed corps of Spanish Americans.The study highlights the congressional 
debates on the Panama Mission of 1826 which bringthe emerging racial ideologies to the 
center stage of public attention.  Their highly publicized words and the rising popularity 
of pseudo-sciences made the theories of racial distinctions and superiority widely 
accepted in the United States by 1830.  For this section, I rely on the Register of Debates, 




13 For full coverage of the debates on the Panama Congress, see Joseph Gales and 
William Winston Seaton, Register of Debates, 19th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 2 
(Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1826). For theories on innate racial distinctions and 
the emergence of Anglo-Saxon ties to the U.S., see Reginald Horsman, Race and 
Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: 









BOLÍVAR AND INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
A Brief History of Bolívar and his Independence Movements 
Simón Bolívar was born on July 24, 1783, in Caracas, Venezuela.  A wealthy 
creole, “Bolívar’s possessions included horse and cattle farms, copper mines, and 
extensive plantations where cacao and cotton were grown.”14  After his parents died, 
Bolívar went to live with Simón Rodríguez, a tutor who taught him of the recent 
revolutions, the new republics, and the liberal ideologies behind them.15  Bolívar’s 
youthful marriage ended abruptly with the sudden death of his wife.  He returned to 
Rodríguez who travelled with him to Europe.16His time in Europe introduced Bolívar to 
Napoleon’s empire and other political strife occurring on the continent at that time.17  On 
August 15, 1805, at the age of twenty-two, Bolívar made his famous vow on Monte Sacro 
in Rome: “I swear before you [Rodríguez], I swear by the God of my fathers, I swear by 
my fathers, I swear by my honour, I swear by my country that I will not rest body or soul 
until I have broken the chains with which Spanish power oppresses us!”18 
                                                            
14WimKlooster, Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History (New York, 
NY: New York University Press, 2009), 137. 
15 Ed. David Bushnell, El Libertador: Writings of Simón Bolívar (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), xiii.  See also John Lynch, Simón Bolívar, 25. 
16Klooster, Revolutions in the Atlantic World, 137. 
17 Lynch, Simón Bolívar, 27. 




 On Bolívar’s return from Europe, he stayed briefly in the United States.  There he 
observed a republican system that nurtured its citizens.  Recalling his visit evoked this 
sentiment: “During my short visit to the United States, I saw rational liberty for the first 
time in my life.”19  His observations influenced his ideas of liberty and republican 
principles throughout the years of the Spanish American revolutions.  These revolutions 
began due to political strife in Europe.  In 1808, Napoleon forced Charles IV and his son 
Ferdinand to abdicate the throne to Joseph Bonaparte.  Juntas – metropolitan political 
committees – formed in various parts of Spain and in her American colonies.  The junta 
of Caracas eventually decided in favor of declaring independence from Spain.  They 
formed a congress and declared their independence on July 5, 1811.20  This republic came 
to an abrupt end after an earthquake destroyed Caracas and many other townsin March, 
1812.  The earthquake demolished buildings which held war materiel for the patriots.  
The clergy blamed the patriotic uprising for God’s vengeance manifested by the 
earthquake.  Factions among the creoles, uprisings from the slaves, and the devastating 
effects of the earthquake ultimately caused the patriots to retreat and the republic to fail.21 
 Bolívar left Venezuela for Curaçao in hopes to regroup the republican efforts.  
Later in 1812, he sailed to Cartagena in New Granada – present day Colombia.  There he 
convinced the republican government at Cartagena to give him command of some troops 
to aid the patriot cause.  He began what is called the Admirable Campaign, freeing the 
                                                            
19 “Beaufort T. Watts to Henry Clay, Cartagena, March 10, 1828” in William R. 
Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the Independence 
of the Latin American Nations (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1925), vol. II, 
1322. 
20 Lynch, Simón Bolívar, 54-55. See also Benjamin Keen and Keith Haynes, A History of 
Latin America (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 160-162. 




areas surrounding the Magdalena River to the border of Venezuela.  General Bolívar 
persuaded the New Granadan politicians that their country would not be free until he had 
liberated Venezuela.  The government at Cartagena permitted Bolívar to continue his 
operation into Venezuela and on to Caracas.  He pushed through Venezuela, gaining 
many victories and eventually walking into an abandoned Caracas in 1813.22In a parade 
celebrating the patriot victory, the creole city council bestowed upon him the title of 
Liberator.23  However, republican power soon received resistance from royalist factions, 
Spanish reinforcements, and the violent, sporadic attacks from llaneros – Venezuelan 
plainsmen.  The patriots retreated from Caracas to eastern Venezuela where Bolívar took 
a boat back to Cartagena to assist in the independence movements there.  Failures to 
further the republican cause forced Bolívar into a self-imposed exile to Jamaica.24 
While in Jamaica, Bolívar wrote to The Royal Gazettein what later became known 
as the Jamaica Letter.  He assessed the patriotic movements in Venezuela and expounded 
the attributes and natural rights of liberal governments.  To help Spanish Americans on 
the path to liberty,Bolívar wrote: “[As] long as our countrymen do not acquire the 
abilities and political virtues that distinguish our brothers of the north, wholly popular 
systems, far from working to our advantage, will, I greatly fear, bring about our 
downfall.”25Educated creoles like Bolívar gained inspiration from Thomas Paine’s 
Common Sense, “the U.S. Constitution, and those of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia” as well as the United States’ Declaration of 
                                                            
22 Ibid., 67-75. 
23Keen and Haynes, A History of Latin America, 163. 
24 Ibid., See also Lynch, Simón Bolívar, 88-89. 
25“Simón Bolívar to Mr. Henry Cullen, ‘Answer of a South American to a Gentleman of 
this Island,’ Kingston, September 6, 1815” in Ed. Harold A. Bierck, Jr., Selected Writings 




Independence!26  The U.S. Declaration deeply influenced the authors of Venezuela’s 
“declaration of independence [… of 1811 which] borrowed entire passages from its 
illustrious example from 1776.”27  Bolívar noted that, “The Venezuelan constitution [… 
has] taken as its model the most perfect constitution ever formulated in terms of the 
correctness of principles and the beneficent effects of its administration, […] the North 
American.” 28  Early on, Bolívar professed a great respect for the democracy of the 
United States and the need for South Americans to acquire “political virtues” to attain 
freedom from Spain. 
 
From Exile to Liberator: Act Two 
 After only a few months in Jamaica, Bolívar resolved to go to Haiti to plan an 
invasion of Venezuela.  He gathered other exiled South American patriots and with the 
assistance of materiel and troops from President Pétion, Bolívar launched an expedition 
to the island of Margarita in March 1816.  Failing to gain a footing on the island, he 
returned to Haiti.  He initiated a second invasion of the country a few months later sailing 
down the Orinoco River to Angostura.  There he set up headquarters and spent the next 
two years gaining small victories and creating alliances with leading caudillos.29In 1819, 
Bolívar gave the Address of Angostura in which he explained that Venezuela relied too 
heavily on the U.S. constitution.  “In my opinion, it is a miracle that [our federal 
                                                            
26Klooster, Revolutions in the Atlantic World, 172. 
27 Ibid. 
28“Discursopronunciadopor el Libertador ante el Congreso de Angostura, 15 Febrero 
1819” in Bolívar, ObrasCompletas III, 680.Translation taken from Bushnell, El 
Libertador, 37. 





constitution’s] model in North America endures with such prosperity and that it does not 
fall apart at the first manifestation of trouble or danger.”  He believed that federalism was 
a “weak and complex” system.  Despite these qualms, Bolívar retained his opinion that 
the U.S.  “is a singular model of political and moral virtue, [… and] is unique in the 
history of the human race.”  However, he did not believe that federalism applied to 
Venezuela: “it never entered my mind to compare the situation and nature of two states as 
diametrically different as English America and Spanish America.”30 
Bolívar utilized this address to announce his plans for the new Venezuelan 
constitution and government.   Having studied Montesquieu, Bolívar knew that the laws 
and liberties of one nation were not applicable to another: “Do we not read in the Spirit of 
Laws that they must be suitable to the country for which they are written?”31  Bolívar 
then relayed that each country has its distinct cultures, climates, religions, economics, and 
geography.  These varying demographics, along with Montesquieu’s L’Esprit des Lois, 
were what Bolívar had in mind when he exclaimed, “This then is the code we should 
consult, not the one written for Washington!”32  He wanted a constitution that worked for 
Venezuela, not a dream but a reality.  
Following Bolívar’s address, the Congress of Angostura created a republican 
constitution and formed the Republic of Colombia.  This republic consisted of the regions 
found in the former Viceroyalty of New Granada: Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Ecuador.33The campaign following the congress of Angostura determined the liberty of 
                                                            
30 “Discurso de Angostura” in Bolívar, ObrasCompletas III, 680.  Translations by author 
from Spanish sources unless otherwise stated. 
31 Ibid., Translation taken from Bushnell, El Libertador, 37. 
32 Ibid. 




the new republic.  The battle of Boyacá in 1819 ensured the independence of Colombia.  
After a brief armistice in 1820, Bolívar and the patriots won the battle of Carabobo which 
guaranteed the freedom of Venezuela.34  Over the next few years, the Liberator and his 
generals gained victories in Guayaquil, Quito, Lima, and Chochabamba. By 1825, all of 
northern South America was free under republican constitutions or in the process of 
creating constitutions.35Political strife, insurrections, and an assassination attempt marred 
the final years of Bolívar’s life between 1826 and 1830.  Peru and Bolivia quickly 
abolished Bolívar’s constitution forming new ones suitable to their republics.36Venezuela 
left the Republic of Colombia followed shortly after by Ecuador in 1830 to create their 
own nations.37The tumult these events produced caused many observers to question the 
stability of the new republican states as well as Bolívar’s leadership abilities.  As the 
United States questioned his commitment to republican values, Bolívar’s views of the 
United States continued to wane. 
 
Bolívar’s Diminishing Opinion of the United States 
The process of liberation required a consistent struggle against Spain and royalist 
factions.  After many years of constant warfare, Bolívar felt hopeless.  He greatly desired 
to establish solid republics in every part of Spanish America.  Nevertheless, he 
recognized this was impossible without help from the U.S.  As early as 1818, Bolívar 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the United States: “There is nothing more horrible than 
                                                            
34Keen and Haynes, A History of Latin America, 164-165. 
35 Lynch, Simón Bolívar, on Ecuador 170, on Peru 192-194 and on Upper Peru (Bolivia) 
198. 
36 Jaime E Rodríguez O., The Independence of Spanish America (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 234-235. 




the conduct of our own countrymen of this continent.  This afflicts the soul because who 
can cure the entire world?  The United States are the worst and the strongest at the same 
time.”38The United States had inspired Bolívar to fight for independence. He anticipated 
real support and aid from the U.S.,instead they stood by as a neutral observer.  Their 
neutrality caused Bolívar to lament that “even our brothers to the North have remained 
peaceful spectators of our extermination.”39Years later, in a message to General O’Leary 
– a close friend and Bolívar’s former aide-de-camp – manifested how distant Bolívar felt 
the U.S. was from South American needs,“I think that it would be better for America to 
adopt the Koran than the government of the United States, even though it be the best in 
the world.”40  Though he admired its republican government, in Bolívar’s eyes the U.S. 
had the power to spread liberty or watch it die.  He believed that the United States “seem 
destined by Providence to plague America with miseries in the name of Freedom.”41 
 Comprehending Bolívar’s evolving views toward the United States is key to 
interpreting diplomatic views reported back to Washington.  As Bolívar’s opinions of the 
U.S. degraded, he looked to various other republican models to find the best form of 
democracy for South America.  As his gaze turned further away from the United States, 
diplomats and newspapers construed his actions as unrepublican.  Though to Bolívar his 
deeds manifested a deep interest in the progress and protection of Spanish Americans, the 
                                                            
38“Simón Bolívar al señor general Pedro Zaraza, Angostura, 9 Agosto 1818” in Bolívar, 
ObrasCompletas, I, 323. 
39“Presidente Bolívar al EXCMO Señorvicepresidente de Cundinamarca, Angostura, 20 
Diciembre 1819” in Bolivar,ObrasCompletas I, 406. 
40“Presidente Bolívar al señor general Daniel F. O’Leary, Guayaquil, 13 
Septiembre1829” in Simón Bolívar, Cartas del Libertador (Caracas, D.F.: Lit. y Tip. del 
Comercio, 1929), vol. IX, 124. 
41 “Presidente Bolívar al señor coronel Patricio Campbell, Encargado de Negocios de 




U.S. saw them as a smokescreen for his underlying ambition for absolute power.  
However, before this scene played out, the United States praised Bolívar as a true 











REVOLUTIONS AND REPUBLICS 
 
 
Venezuela and the Question of Recognition 
In 1811, Venezuela declared freedom from Spain and sent delegates to various 
countries requesting recognition.  Before the United States recognized any of the South 
American provinces, it required evidence that those states could maintain their 
independence from Spain.  After a tragic earthquake hit Venezuela in early 1812 the 
United States commissioned Alexander Scott as an agent for the relief of the victims in 
Caracas.  James Monroe, then the U.S. Secretary of State, wrote these instructions for 
Scott’s commission: “[You are] to ascertain how far those Provinces are competent to its 
support […].  If the people are resolved to maintain their independence, their success 
seems to be inevitable.  The United States take a sincere interest in it […].”  As 
pertaining to Scott’s conduct as a representative of the U.S., Monroe cautioned, 
“Nothing, however, would be more absurd than for the United States to acknowledge 
their independence in form, until it was evident that the people themselves were resolved 
and able to support it.”42 
The U.S. wanted concrete evidence that South Americans would retain their 
freedom before siding against Spain by recognizing the independence of her warring 
colonies.  The reports from Scott did not inspire hope of recognition.  In a dispatch to 
                                                            
42“James Monroe to Alexander Scott, Washington, May 14, 1812” in Manning, 




Monroe, dated November 16, 1812, Scott described the people in Venezuela as not fit 
“for the enjoyment of a free and rational government.  Certain principles of honor, virtue 
and morality are wanting […].  Their minds require to be more enlightened, and 
emancipated from the absolute sway of ignorant and depraved clergy.”43  Days before 
leaving Venezuela, he gave his opinion on the diplomatic course the United States should 
follow.  “Towards the patriots of South America, our government, cannot, in my opinion, 
pursue a conduct too friendly.”44Due to the lack of republican principles Scott observed, 
he felt it necessary to maintain a cautious relationship with Venezuela.  His report helped 
influence the U.S. to choose a path of neutrality toward the emerging Spanish American 
provinces.  This neutrality became certain in the Neutrality Act of 1815, delayed in 
Congress as a result of the War of 1812. 
The U.S. government had many reasons to seek intelligence on the Spanish 
American provinces.  The United States was a young republic which did not wish to 
make enemies.  Politicians knew that if they granted official recognition to any of the 
Spanish American republics, they would consciously be declaring war against Spain!45  
John Quincy Adams, writing to Secretary Monroe in 1816, stated, “[If] the United States 
were openly to join the cause of South America, […] the British people would 
immediately consider them as the principals in the contest […] and engage this nation 
upon the side of Spain, merely because the United States would be on the other 
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side.”46The country had recently terminated a war with England and did not wish to 
provoke another conflict.  To prevent war with Spain and Great Britain, the U.S. chose 
neutrality during the wars in the South American states.47Congress passed the Neutrality 
Act in 1815 to maintain peace and trade with Europe and the Caribbean.  Adams “made 
clear the conditions under which the United States would recognize a new Spanish 
American republic: ‘It is the stage when independence is established as a matter of fact so 
as to leave the chances of the opposite party to recover their dominion utterly 
desperate.’”48Though the United States recognized “Gran Colombia (which included 
Venezuela) before any other independent Latin American nation,”prolonged civil war in 
South America delayed recognition of the southern republics until 1822.  By this time, 
many in the U.S. had acquired an admiration for Bolívar as the Liberator of South 
America. 
 
Their Cause as Our Own: Praises toBolívar 
and the Patriots of South America 
 Early press reports on General Bolívar depicted him in a positive manner.  
However, one of the earliest articles stated, “The most horrible scenes of barbarity are 
committed at Venezuela since the fierce monster, Bolivar, joining a band of assassins and 
thieves has forced some people of color and creoles to follow his banners, and carry 
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plunder, bloodshed, devastation and terror throughout that unhappy region.”49 Despite 
this negative descriptionthe editor of the Commercial Advertiser of New York wrote that 
General Bolívar was “an able and brave man.”50  As the war continued, admiration from 
the press grew as well: “Bolivar […] is a gentleman of high and honourable [sic] 
feelings; of courage and activity.  He has embarked all his wealth, which was considered 
as immense, in the great cause in which he is engaged.”51  Feelings of congeniality 
toward the Spanish American patriots reflected the cherish sentiments the U.S. held to the 
patriots of the American Revolution. 
 Praise for Bolívar and his patriots permeated patriotic activities and events 
celebrating U.S. independence.  Newspapers presented toasts given in Bolívar’s honor at 
public occasions. On July 4, 1816, West Point cadets toasted, “The patriots of South 
America”: “While remembering our forefathers, we can but view with kindred emotions, 
the efforts of those new champions of the same cause.”52  One man from Kentucky 
proclaimed, “Success to their struggles for Independence – our hearts are with them.”53  
The Richmond Enquirer wrote a column in 1817 summarizing the toasts given at the 
recent Fourth of July parties, “[The] favorite sentiment from all numbers and all parties 
has been, Success to the Spanish [American] Patriots.”54Following the trend in 1819, a 
group called the Philadelphia Fencibles raised their cups to “America: May the South be 
as successful as the North.”55In almost all of these cases, people in the United States 
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perceived the South American patriots as imitating their own path to independence.  As 
they observed the republican movements from afar, they noticed a resemblance to their 
own struggle for independence years before.   
 
Newspapers Laud Bolívar as Washington 
 Bolívar’s bold leadership in the wars for independence in South America led 
many to compare him to George Washington.  In fact many people in the United States 
viewed Bolívar as the “Washington of South America.”56  Hezekiah Niles in his weekly 
newspaper wrote,“Bolivar is efficiently copying the most illustrious traits in the character 
to our Washington – May he continue faithful to the end, and become entitled to be called 
‘the father of his country!’”57  In response to the final victory at Carthagena, Niles 
asserted, “Another Washington has hewed out the path of another country’s glory, and 
the hope may be well entertained that the United States will not constitute the only 
republic – remain the only section of the world wherein it is acknowledged that men 
possess certain ‘natural and unalienable rights.’”58His articles illustrated a natural 
inclination to project the republican history of the United States onto Bolívar and the 
nascent Spanish American provinces. 
By 1825, republican victories over Spain ensured South American independence 
which encouraged many leaders in the United States to openly toast Bolívar at public 
occasions.  At one public dinner celebrating the New Year, Henry Clay proposed, 
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“General Bolivar, the Washington of South America, and the Republic of Colombia.”59  
Three months later in March, General Andrew Jackson wrote a message to be read at a 
dinner he could not attend.  In this letter General Jackson submitted this toast: “Bolivar – 
Blessed by the same Divinity that guided our Revolutionary struggles, he has given 
Freedom and Independence to his country – May he resign his commission to the People 
as the only legitimate source of power, and thereby be associated with our immortal 
Washington.”60  One toast came after a Fourth of July parade during a celebration of the 
Washington Cavalry: “Simon Bolivar, the founder of South American Independence: He 
follows the footsteps of Washington in the path to immortality.”61  Also in 1825, Vice 
President John C. Calhoun toasted, “The Patriots of South America: We rejoice in their 
success, and hail their Bolivar as a second Washington.”62As South America became a 
land of liberty, many in the U.S. believed Bolívar’s actions in the cause of freedom 
deserved the glory of Washington.  Bolívar reached the height of his career as a military 
leader and liberator of South America.  Within the year, reports of Bolívar’s lust for 
power dissuaded some from comparing him to General Washington.   
 
Bolívar’s Ambition Reaches the United States 
The toasts of 1825 highlighted the peak of praise toward Bolívar within the 
United States.  Fitz stated that toasts to Bolívar dropped dramatically and never fully 
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recovered after 1826.63Despite what some began to think, the press continued to bestow 
honor on the Liberator’s character.  Ashbel Green – editor of the Christian Advocate in 
Philadelphia – wrote in May 1825, “Bolívar seems to be a man of noble spirit, of sterling 
integrity, and of true republican principles.”64  Green’s assessment equaled the views of 
many other editors in the U.S.  The Daily National Intelligencer of Washington, D.C., 
reprinted an article from the North American Review which depicted Bolívar as the “most 
brilliant star in Colombian history, and indeed in the history of modern revolutions.”  The 
article described his accomplishments and then asserted, “His ambition has never been 
too strong for his integrity, and a sincere desire for his country’s good.”65  The editor of 
the North American Review recognized Bolívar’s ambitious nature; however, he believed 
that the Liberator’s altruistic characteristics prevented him from doing any real harm to 
his countrymen. 
Despite the optimistic reports from the press, some questioned whether or not 
Bolívar deserved praise from the United States.  One former statesman and diplomat felt 
that comparing Bolívar to Washington was premature.  Alexander Everett wrote a book 
on his travels in South America during the height of admiration in the U.S. towards 
Bolívar.  He noted, “The attempt to compare them [Bolivar and Washington] is wholly 
premature.  Bolivar is still in the midst of his career; […] the glorious mission which has 
been allotted to him, it is nevertheless too early to award the prize before the race is run.”  
Everett believed that despite all of Bolívar’s labors and great efforts among his 
countrymen, he needed to accomplish one more act to prove himself worthy of 
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Washington’s acclaim.  Everett described this final act as “more difficult, if we may 
judge at least by its rarity, then all the rest; and without which all the rest will go for 
nothing and worse than nothing.”  Leading an entire region of South America into wars 
of independence against Spain held no merit compared to what Everett believed Bolívar’s 
actions lacked.  “He has yet to show, that he knows the difference between true and false 
greatness, that is, between true greatness and a hoop of gold or a wooden seat covered 
with velvet.”  Everett referred to Bolívar’s ambitions for glory and power.  “After 
subduing hostile enemies, he has yet to subdue (if he is unfortunate enough to feel them) 
the impulses of irregular ambition.”66 
Everett enumerated further actions he thought requisite for Bolívar aside from 
controlling his ambition.  The Liberator had to do all to assist his countrymen in the 
“foundation and administration of their civil institutions, must have rescued them from 
monarchy, as he had redeemed them before from foreign bondage, must have held out to 
them the graceful and edifying example of a private life corresponding in dignity and 
purity with the glory of his public career.”  In order for Bolívar to attain a comparable 
position with Washington, he would have to seal his liberal actions with his death.  
“[And] finally must have brought his earthly course to an honourable end. […] All this, 
however, must be done before Bolivar can claim the honour of being a worthy and 
successful student in the school of Washington.  Greater honour than this he need not 
wish, and can never under any circumstances aspire to.”  Though Everett recognized 
within Bolívar aspirations for power and glory beyond that which Washington acquired, 
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he retained his faith in the Liberator.  “I feel the fullest confidence that he will justify the 
hopes of the world, and terminate as he has commenced.”67 
Rumors of Bolívar’s ambition caused some to question his republicanism and the 
honor bestowed upon him as the“Washington of South America.”  The press continued to 
focus on the Liberator’s qualities which had given northern South America its freedom 
from Spain.  His deeds as a military leader and patriotic hero followed the patterns of the 
heroes from the American Revolution.  Some people in the U.S. believed Bolívar’s 
ambition prevented him from achieving true glory.  They felt that Bolívar needed to step 
down from his supreme powers and give them back to the people – liked Washington had 
done.  People in the U.S. continued applying their model of liberty, democracy, and 
selfless service to a distant hero who – to them – nolonger resembled a true republican.
                                                            









STRIVE FOR POWER, FALL FROM GRACE 
 
 
The Dilemma of Power: The Perus, Monarchy, and Empire68 
Opinions of Bolívar varied dramatically after knowledge of his ambition for more 
authority reached the United States.Diplomats and the press tended to report first positive 
and then negative views toward Bolívar.  The special agent of the U.S. to Peru, John B. 
Prevost, championed the efforts of the Liberator.  In addressing the prolonged war in 
Peru, Prevost lamented, “All has been adverse to Bolivar since his arrival; he has had to 
surmount difficulties that would have appalled a man less firm and less ardent in the 
cause.”  Prevost specified the difficulties Bolívar faced in Peru:  “[He] has had to contend 
with Civil dissentions; he has had to watch over domestic treason among those to whom 
he was compelled to lend a portion of his confidence; and he has had to encounter the 
dereliction of a powerful Body of Troops, upon which he had a right to rely.”69  In 
Prevost’s eyes, Bolívar deserved more than the hardships he received in the struggle for 
Peru’s independence.   
William Tudor, who served as the U.S. Minister to Peru, agreed with Prevost’s 
assessment of the Liberator.  He arrived in Lima as a passionate admirer of General 
Bolívar.  He believed that Bolívar was the only leader in South America with the ability 
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to maintain order and to establish a republic in the region: only through the Liberator 
could Peru remain peaceful and safe.70Reporting to Clay on Bolívar’s character, Tudor 
described him as “ardent” and “impetuous,” but that Bolívar “appears to be a man of too 
much talent to follow the career of false ambition which his enemies attribute to him, 
which would cause his ruin, & would degrade him inevitably from the lofty station in the 
list of pure & virtuous patriot.”71  Less than a month later, in May of 1826, Tudor wrote 
to Clay on the current conditions in Peru.  Heheavily critiquedBolívar based on 
intelligence that the Liberator desired to establish an empire in South America.Tudor 
angrily wrote, “The deep hypocrisy of General Bolivar has hitherto deceived the world 
[…].”72  This intelligence informed Tudor that Bolívar recently accepted authoritarian 
powers in Peru while retaining his supreme powers in the Republic of Colombia.   
Tudor soon acknowledged the previous reports of Bolívar’s lust for power.  After 
acquiring dictatorial power over Peru and dissolving Congress, Tudor claimed, “[Bolivar] 
has evidently passed the Rubicon, but is still within sight of its banks, & might secure his 
retreat: the desperate hope that he will do so is hardly worth entertaining.”  The minister’s 
intense loathing for Bolívar came from what Tudor saw as a betrayal of trust in the U.S. 
and in Spanish Americans.  Tudor reflected, “I have believed Gen. Bolivar, animated by 
the most pure & lofty ambition, & that notwithstanding some defects of private character, 
& personal traits & habits wholly dissimilar, that he had taken a model in view, of which 
we are so proud, & the world so admiring.”  In this he referred to Washington and the 
United States as Bolívar’s model.  Tudor accredited his faith in Bolívar to the fame and 
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glory which “posterity would have recognized him.”  However, with the reality of 
Bolívar’s ambition confirmed, Tudor admitted that he “could never believe any man 
would descend from that lofty eminence […] to confound himself with the ignoble herd 
of ambitious, usurping, military chieftains.”73 
From that day in 1826, Tudor became a fierce opponent of the Liberator 
President.  He began comparing Bolívar to another known military despot and tyrant, 
Napoleon.74  In July of 1826, Tudor reported to Clay, “A year ago [Bolivar] appeared 
pleased with the comparison to Washington, & affected to resent that with 
Napoleon.”75He viewed the Liberator as following Napoleon’s example instead of 
Washington due to Bolívar’s rumored imperial plans.  Tudor’s next correspondence 
depicted a Bolívar who wished to form his own path to glory.  “[On] his birthday last 
week, [… Bolivar] declared himself a greater man than any which history has recorded, 
that not only the heroes of antiquity were inferiour [sic] to him in ‘liberal ideas’, but that 
Washington & Napoleon he had left much in the rear.”76  Bolívar felt that Washington 
and Napoleon did not merit the same acclaim which he had attained.  Actions such as 
these caused many diplomats to view Bolívar as unrepublican and no longer comparable 
to Washington. 
Tudor’s dispatches to Clay described the details of Bolívar’s deceit.  “His solemn, 
reiterated, & vehement protestations of disinterestedness, [… and] affected horrour [sic] 
of the dictatorship, his contemptuous refusal of the millions offered him, his declaration 
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that he would not take a grain of sand from Peru, all contributed to deceive the world.”  
All this Bolívar did, Tudor thought, “while he was preparing to make himself master of 
the country, & from South America into one empire.”77When reports from Peru detailed 
the new authoritarian powers Bolívar had acquired, editors justified Bolívar’s actions.  
The Commercial Advertiser of New York wrote, “Year after year we behold him 
resigning offices, public honors, and powers, and in almost every instance taking upon 
himself again the next day, higher offices, greater honors and more extensive powers.  
And yet, we know of no instance of his playing the tyrant.”78Charles Hammond – a friend 
to Henry Clay – included his justification of Bolívar in a letter to Clay.  “Perhaps the 
condition of that Country renders this course on his part indispensible – It is easy to 
perceive that he could contribute much to produce that very state of things, which 
furnishes the best apology for his present course.”79However, the Niles’ Weekly 
Registerresponded to Bolívar’s ambitious designs stating, “[We] are apprehensive that 
Bolívar is about to resign his pretensions to the character of the ‘Washington of the 
South.’  We would yet hope not.”80 
To Tudor, the Liberator’s many renunciations of authority masked his greatest 
aspiration – an empire.  Tudor believed that Bolívar’s “inordinate, insane ambition, 
which aims at forming an empire of more extensive limits, than any the world has known, 
will leave no doubt as to his motive in preparing [Peru’s new] constitution [with a life-
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term presidency].”81Bolívar had already applied this constitution to the new Republic of 
Bolivia.  Bolivia’s constitution contained elements of Bolívar’s tendency toward 
centralized, and possibly monarchical, authority. 
 
The Roots for Bolívar’s Monarchy 
Early on, Bolívar expressed his desires for a Spanish American union under a 
single government.  While in exile at Jamaica in 1815 he wrote, “It is a grandiose idea to 
think of consolidating the New World into a single nation, united by parts into a single 
bond.  It is reasoned that, as these parts have a common origin, language, customs, and 
religion, they ought to have a single government to permit the newly formed states to 
unite in a confederation.”  Despite confessing that unity was impossible due to regional 
differences, Bolívar sustained a belief in a united South America.82  He wanted a Spanish 
American alliance which could rival Great Britain and the United States.  In his Address 
of Angostura he professed that England’s government was a “perfect model for a 
kingdom, for an aristocracy, or for a democracy.”83Despite this admission, J. Fred Rippy 
wrote that Bolívar first realistically contemplated a monarchy for South America while in 
Peru. 
 According to Rippy, Bolívar met several times with British diplomats posted in 
Peru.  He argued, “In all of [the conferences with British agents in Peru] Bolívar evinced 
both a preference for the English political system and a desire for an English alliance, and 
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so was placing himself in opposition to the favorite Yankee ideas of republicanism and 
New World isolation.”84In one such meeting in 1825, Bolívar met with a British 
representative named Captain Thomas Maling.  Captain Maling wrote to Lord Melville 
about the contents of his meeting with General Bolívar.  He related to Melville that 
Bolívar had said, “No country, […] is more free than England, under a well-regulated 
Monarchy; England is the envy of all Countries in the world, and the pattern all would 
wish to follow in forming a new Constitution and Government.”  Bolívar further 
explained his desires for England’s assistance: “Democracy has its charms for the people, 
[…] but England is again our example. […]  If we are to have a new Government let it be 
modelled [sic] on yours.”85  According to Maling, Bolívar applauded England for its 
constitutional monarchy while questioning the permanence of the republican government 
in the United States.  Bolívar desired a monarchy which could appease both the 
commonwealth as well as the aristocracy. 
 Less than a year later, Bolívar met with the British diplomat Charles Ricketts in 
Lima.  Consistent with Captain Maling’s report, Ricketts wrote, “For an ally [Bolívar] 
preferred England to any other country, ‘even more than any of the States of America.’ 
[…] As for himself, he ‘most assuredly did not at this juncture uphold a Republican form 
of Government as superior to another.’”  Bolívar did not focus on the United States as a 
model for Spanish American republics.  He wanted to create a republic that worked for 
the various people of South America.  Bolívar believed that England’s democratic 
monarchy provided the best example for such a government.  Then Bolívar revealed to 
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Ricketts his persistent internal conflict concerning Old World and New World definitions 
of authority.  “He also said that his heart always beat in favor of liberty, but that his head 
ever leaned toward aristocracy.”86Though the New World contended that power rested in 
the people, Bolívar felt that South America required Old World solutions for the problem 
of governance.  The Bolivian Constitution manifested his inclination to aristocracy and 
authority. 
 
The Bolivian Constitution: Foundation for an Empire 
Reports from South America detailed the constitution Bolívar authored for 
Bolivia which prescribed a life-term presidency with the right to name his successor.  
Bolívar applied this same constitution to Peru months later with designs to present it 
before Colombia.87  A U.S. agent in Paris at the time – James Brown – stated that 
Bolívar’s acceptance of such a presidency was considered “as a prelude to declaring 
himself Emperor of all South America.”88In reaction to news of the Bolivian 
Constitution, the editor for the Commercial Advertiser claimed that too many newspapers 
had “ridiculously enough styled [Bolívar as the] WASHINGTON of South America.”89  
The editor of the Niles’ Weekly Register reacted similarly when he confirmed accounts of 
Bolívar’s ambitious plans.  “We now fear, indeed that Bolivar, […] whose name should 
have descended to the most distant posterity associated with that of Washington, as 
common benefactors of mankind, will, have hereafter to be regarded as a traitor to 
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liberty– the tyrant and not the liberator of his countrymen.”90  People in the U.S. believed 
that imperial plans completely rejected principles of republicanism and liberty.  To them, 
Bolívar was no longer a patriot but a traitor and a tyrant. 
Concerning Bolívar’s quest for a South American empire, New York’s 
Commercial Advertiser reprinted an extract of a letter they had received from a 
Baltimorean living in Peru.  The informant claimed that “Gen. Bolivar has, I believe, 
been playing a deep game.”  He then explained that while the general passed through 
Peru, Bolívar informed legislators that there would be no congressional meetings.  The 
majority of these members excused themselves from congress which caused “that there 
[was] not enough to form a quorum.  He then assumes the extraordinary power, gets 
everything altered […] then resigns the Presidency, well knowing there would be no 
person to accept it […].”  The Baltimorean elucidated that all of this was done according 
to Bolívar’s desire, “which was to form the whole of Bolivia, Peru and Colombia in one 
General Government and place himself at the head of it.”91 
In reaction to such reports from South America, the Commercial Advertiser 
divulged they had long believed the Liberator guilty of imperialistic ambitions.  “This 
intelligence [reports of Bolívar attempting to create a military confederacy between 
Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia] only confirms the opinion which we have long entertained 
of Bolivar.  We never had any confidence in the republicanism of the man.  That he aims 
at the universal absolute dominion of the Southern Continent, we have long believed.”92  
The press considered Bolívar to be unrepublican, siding with Niles’ prior claim that 
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General Bolívar was “a traitor to liberty.”  By 1827 “Bolívar’s reputation in the United 
States had already declined.”93 
In maintaining perceptions that Bolívar followed the pattern set by Washington, 
Nileswrote, “[In] the early stage of that republic it was certainly necessary that an 
individual of his talents, patriotism and discernment, should take the helm of the state, 
until the government was somewhat matured.”  Bolívar’s qualities mirrored 
Washington’s characteristics which had brought freedom to the United States.  However, 
Bolívar retained his power and sought more.  Upon establishing a free and democratic 
republic, Niles clarified that once “this was accomplished and the people manifested a 
capacity for self-government, he should have retired from the presidential chair and stood 
by in the capacity of a counsellor [sic] and friend, to prove that the existence of their 
institutions did not depend upon one man, but that they were implanted in every 
[citizen].”94Like Bolívar’s presumed model, Washington, the Liberator needed to 
relinquish his authority and return it to the people consistent with conceived republican 
principles within the United States. 
 
Era of Disillusionment: Reactions to Bolívar 
James Cooley, U.S. Charges d’Affaires at Lima, seemed uncertain as to which 
opinions of Bolívar were correct.  In a letter to Secretary Henry Clay, he wrote, “I am 
free to confess, I have been slow in forming opinions adverse to the principles of one 
[Bolivar] who has done so much for the cause of Independence in this quarter of the 
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world.  But proofs multiply upon proofs in such a manner as to be irresistible.”95  Within 
the year Cooley grew leery of Bolívar’s motivesand reported to Clay, “It can certainly 
neither accord with our principles, our feelings, or our interests, to witness these immense 
regions sinking under a military government – the whole concentrated in the hands of a 
single ambitious and profligate individual.”96Cooley believed that continued relations 
with a military despotism incongruent to U.S. republicanism put the United States in a 
potentially questionable position. 
 By 1828, many were aware of the rumors that Bolívar sought a crown and a South 
American empire.  General William Henry Harrison, recently arrived U.S. Minister to 
Colombia, quickly fell in with the anti-Bolívar crowd in Bogotá.  He soon made up his 
mind about the Liberator President and “charged that Bolívar was a tyrant with 
monarchical tendencies.”97Shortly after Harrison arrived in Colombia, Martin Van Buren 
– the new Secretary of State under President Andrew Jackson – recalled him assigning 
his commission to Thomas P. Moore, a former statesman from Kentucky.  Harrison’s 
most diplomatic act in South America came as a private citizen after Moore relieved 
Harrison of his commission.  Just before Harrison embarked from Colombia, he wrote a 
personal letter to Bolívar in which he rebuked the Liberator for seeking unlimited powers.  
Harrison tried to persuade Bolívar not to aspire to more authority, but to seek a place next 
to Washington as an immortal legend.  General Harrison wrote, 
[Nor] can a citizen of the country of Washington cease to wish that, in 
Bolivar, the world might behold another instance of the highest military 
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attainments united with the purest patriotism, and the greatest capacity for 
civil government.  Such, sir, have been the fond hopes, not only of the 
people of the United States, but of the friends of liberty throughout the 
world. […] But trust me, sir, that there is nothing more corrupting, nothing 
more destructive of the noblest and finest feelings of our nature, than the 
exercise of unlimited power. […] The people of Colombia posses many 
traits, suitable for a republican government.  A more orderly, forbearing, 
and well-disposed people are nowhere to be met with. […] Are you 
willing that your name should descend to posterity, amongst the mass of 
those whose fame has been derived from shedding human blood, without a 
single advantage to the human race?  Or, shall it be united to that of 
Washington, as the founder and father of a great and happy people?  The 
choice is before you.  The friends of liberty throughout the world, and the 
people of the United States in particular, are waiting for decision with 
intense anxiety.98 
 
Harrison’s words revealed that many continued to project their perceptions of democratic 
leadership attained from the example of Washington.  Reports from South American 
during this period influence the Adams administration and the press to interpret Bolívar’s 
actions as inconsistent with republican principles in the United States.  No other example 
illustrated this concept more than two of Henry Clay’s letters as Secretary of State. 
 
Henry Clay’s Letters 
 Henry Clay served as the Secretary of State during Bolívar’s darkest years as a 
leader in South America.  Before his appointment, he was known as the champion of 
Spanish America on the floor of Congress.99  Bolívar even wrote a letter of gratitude to 
Clay for his service on the behalf of South Americans: “All America, Colombia, and 
myself, owe your excellency our purest gratitude for the incomparable services you have 
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rendered to us.”100  Although Clay had done much for South American recognition, 
correspondence from his agents began to alter his opinion of the Liberator.  In a message 
to General Lafayette, Clay disclosed, “You will recollect that […] I proposed as a toast 
Bolivar, the Washington of South America.  I must revoke or at least suspend that 
sentiment.”  Secretary Clay regretfully informed Lafayette “that evidence has reached me 
from so many quarters, and of a kind so entirely satisfactory, that I can no longer resist 
the conviction, which I very reluctantly adopted, that he has conceived and actually 
commenced the execution of a vast project of ambition, which involved the overthrow of 
the liberties of South America.”  He clarified, “That project was no less than the ultimate 
establishment of an Empire which should stretch from the Isthmus of Dairen to Cape 
Horn.”101 
As Secretary of State, his agents had provided ample proof of Bolívar’s ambitious 
plans.  Clay felt that such a project destroyed liberty instead of supporting it.  To Clay, 
principles of republicanism nurtured liberty and freedom among its people.  Clay 
explained the details of Bolívar’s project to Lafayette: “The first movement was the 
Bolivian Constitution, with its President for life &c; the next its adoption in Lima; the 
third which he proposed was its introduction in Colombia; and then he designed the union 
of Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, which were to form a nucleus only for ulterior 
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purposes.”102  Instead of building governments consistent with republican values found in 
the United States, this project sought to form an empire with Bolívar at its head.   
Clay believed that Bolívar was on the verge of committing horrible crimes against 
liberty.  Clay informed General Lafayette that Bolívar “has grown, I understand, 
passionate, impatient and overbearing, and takes Bonaparte as his model.  Was ever man 
guilty of greater folly?  What glory awaited him, if he had been true to Liberty and to his 
Country!  Greater than ever man has acquired or can achieve.”103Maintaining a 
perception that the United States provided the best model for republicanism, Clay 
lamented Bolívar’s turn toward Napoleonic desires.  His reference to “Bonaparte as his 
model” clearly demonstrated the influence of Tudor’s messages on Clay.  In 1828, he 
responded to Bolívar’s letter from the year before.  Though written with diplomacy, the 
message rebuked Bolívar for his schemes to create an empire or establish a monarchy.   
Clay informed Bolívar that the United States had hoped for a “great and virtuous 
man” to bring liberty, peace and safety to South America.  “We have even flattered 
ourselves that we beheld that genius in your excellency; but […] that ambitious designs 
have been attributed by your enemies to your excellency, which have created in my mind 
great solicitude.”  The U.S. saw Bolívar’s recent activities as unrepublican.  Supporters 
for South American independence, like Clay, wondered how a patriot of liberty could so 
easily set aside basic republican principles.  Trying to reassure Bolívar that he hadn’t lost 
faith in the Liberator, Clay wrote “I have been most unwilling to credit the unfavorable 
accounts which have […] reached me.”  He then quietly rebuked and warned Bolívar for 
what consequences his ambitious plans would bring.  “I cannot allow myself to believe 
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that your excellency will abandon the bright and glorious path which lies plainly before 
you, for the bloody road, passing over the liberties of the human race, on which the 
vulgar crowd of tyrants and military despots have often trodden.”  He followed this 
caution with friendly support, believing that Bolívar would soon “render a satisfactory 
explanation to Colombia, and to the world, of the parts of your public conduct which 
have excited any distrust.”  Clay reminded the Liberator of “the true glory of our 
immortal Washington,” and of Bolívar’s own “patriotic resolution of ultimately placing 
the freedom of Colombia upon a firm and sure foundation.”  He concluded, “That your 
efforts to that end, may be crowned with complete success, I most fervently pray.”104  
Though Clay’s faith in the Liberator had faltered, he reminded Bolívar of the glorious 
example already before him – Washington.  As long as Bolívar promoted republican 
values and principles, Clay and others would continue to support his cause. 
 
The Jackson Administration: Press Versus Policy 
Prior to the Jackson administration, people looked to the founding fathers as a 
guide for principles and policy.  By Jackson’s election, a majority of politicians and 
citizens were not alive during the American Revolution or too young to remember the 
sensation of their newly created republic.  The current generation admired the heroes of 
the War of 1812 and the recent battles in Florida – which Jackson had led.  As a fellow 
warrior turned statesman, Jackson looked to Bolívar’s patriotic accomplishments to 
define his administration’s view of the Liberator.  They did not project U.S. 
republicanism onto Bolívar.  Rather they focused on his heroism and liberalism, traits 
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Jackson admired.  In May 1829, Secretary Van Buren wrote to the Colombian Consul 
General at New York, Xavier de Medina.  He noted that Bolívar’s “past services in the 
cause of freedom and his Country the history of Colombia affords so many striking 
proofs and whose continued attachment to the principles of free Government will I trust 
be made equally manifest by future events.”105 
Despite an optimistic policy toward Bolívar, not all U.S. diplomats posted in the 
northern South America shared this view.  Samuel Larned, the Consul at Lima, reported 
to Van Buren “that this powerful leader was a factor to be reckoned with all the way from 
Mexico to Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. […]Bolivar’s influence […] uniformly manifests 
itself inimical to the interests and good name of the United States, and their 
government.”106Larned saw through the previous acts of heroismand liberalism to the 
ambitious Bolívar who was attempting to establish an empire or monarchy.  J.G.A. 
Williamson, U.S. Consul at La Guayra, blamed personal meetings which Bolívar held 
with British Minister Cockburn in 1827 for filling Bolívar’s head with monarchical 
designs.  He informed Van Buren, “That Genl Bolivar has had & may yet have such 
views [toward monarchical policies] I have no doubt.”107 
Reports like these from Larned and Williamson inspired editors to write less 
cautiously about the Liberator.  The Niles’ Weekly Register ran an article stating, “The 
accounts from Colombia, if to be relied on, pretty clearly shew that Bolívar has become a 
traitor to liberty.  We have long feared this, but yet hoped the preservation of the 
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republic.  In time, and after the military spirit has been fully subjected to the civil power, 
Colombia might be regenerated […].”108  Knowing thatnegative reports from diplomats 
directly influenced the U.S. population through the press, Van Buren forwarded President 
Jackson’s policy toward Bolívar to his agents.“The President is unwilling to believe that 
he [Bolívar] who has made such liberal sacrifices […], can ever consent to exchange the 
imperishable renown which posterity will doubtless award to the constant and untiring 
patron of public liberty for the fleeting and sordid gratification of personal 
aggrandizement.”109  President Jackson reaffirmed his belief that the Liberator would not 
renounce his position in history for personal ambition. 
According to the U.S. Minister to Colombia – Thomas Moore – Bolívar“spoke of 
[President Jackson] in terms of the highest admiration, as a patriot and a warrior.”110  In 
January 1830, President Jackson received a gold medal from General Bolívar.  The medal 
commemorated Bolívar’s escape from assassins on September 25, 1829.  When President 
Jackson presented the medal to Congress he warned, “The powerful influence […] of 
General Bolivar […] creates an anxiety as to his future course in which the friends of 
liberal institutions throughout the world deeply participate.”  Almost as an answer to this 
caution, Jackson added, “The favorable estimate which I have formed of the nature of the 
services rendered by him, and of his personal character, impresses me with the strongest 
confidence that his conduct in the present condition of his country will be such as may 
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best promote her true interest and best secure his own permanent fame.”111  The president 
held no doubts that time would vindicate Bolívar’s actions as a leader in South America. 
 
BolívarSeeks to Redeem his Title: El Libertador 
Bolívar Resigns 
In January 1830, Bolívar resigned from the office of president for the last time.112  
The New York Commercial Advertiser responded to his proclamation of resignation: “It 
will thus be seen that for the seventeenth time Bolivar has made a parade of resigning his 
arbitrary power.  If he is in earnest this time, it is because he has found public opinion 
two [sic] powerful to carry his views into effect.”113Later the newspaper questioned the 
genuineness of Bolívar’s withdrawal from his authority. “Whether the retirement of 
Bolivar has been voluntary or not, and whether his purpose to depart was sincere or 
feigned, still remains to be seen.”114John Quincy Adams also doubted Bolívar’s ability to 
resign indefinitely.  After Henry William Harrison arrived home from Colombia, Adams 
invited the general to his home.  After meeting with Harrison about his time in Colombia, 
Adams wrote in his diary: 
The conduct of Bolivar has for many years been equivocal.  As a military 
leader, his course has been despotic and sanguinary.  His principles of 
government have been always monarchical, but for himself he has 
repeatedly played off the farce of renouncing his power and going into 
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retirement.  He still holds out this pretence, while at the same time he 
cannot disguise his hankering for a crown.115 
 
By 1830, the U.S. repeatedly observed Bolívar resign his authority only to regain it.  
Bolívar’s unrepublican views of power created disillusionment in the United States which 
persisted even after Bolívar’s final resignation from politics. 
Bolívar left Bogotá with the intentions of leaving South America and traveling to 
Europe in self-imposed exile.  After Bolívar left the city, Moore wrote to Van Buren of 
Bolívar’s “talents, private integrity and past services and disinterested conduct, [and] 
when I recollect, that he made the first stand for liberty in Venezuela with his own slaves, 
liberating them to fight the battles of Freedom, […] although he has frequently erred, I 
cannot but regret his departure.”116  The press did not share Moore’s views on Bolívar’s 
resignation.  In reflecting on Bolívar’s career, the editor of the Niles’ Weekly Register 
wrote, “it is hard to believe that he always preserved his balance, as a republican 
statesman.”117  Some papers questioned if Bolívar’s sincerity about going into exile once 
he began to delay his departure from the coast.  The Commercial Advertiser editorialized, 
“The course of Bolivar is truly a singular one, and it baffles conjecture to anticipate what 
will be the ultimate conduct of the Liberator.”118 
The editor included a column assessing Bolívar’s conduct and the tensions his 
delay created.  “It may be that after all Colombia is not fit to be free, and that Canning 
and Clay made splendid mistakes in helping her to assume the attitude of a nation.”  
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Hewondered if the people required a charismatic leader such as Bolívar, or if the 
Liberator believed the republic needed him.  “It may be that nothing but a dictator will do 
for her, and that Bolivar, understanding this, is willing to sacrifice his consistency for the 
sixth or seventh time, (for so often has he solemnly asseverated his determination to retire 
from the exercise of power,) all for the good of his country.”  Believing that Bolívar had 
failed as a republican leader, the paper stated, “we are sorry that he means to remain and 
trouble the waters.  If he would depart with his thousand generals, these would soon be 
calm.”119Doubts remained in the United States as to whether or not Bolívar was genuine 
in his resignation and departure.   
Even papers that were friendly to Bolívar began to questions his motives.  The 
Pennsylvania Inquirer – one such paper – contained an article on Bolívar’s delay: 
“Although the late relinquishment of supreme power by that chieftain, and his declaration 
that he meant hereafter to remain forever in retirement, were calculated to make a 
favorable impression on the public mind of this country as to the integrity of his 
intentions, our apprehensions concerning his real views have been revived by the mystery 
and equivocal nature of his movements.”  The delayed exile and reports of threats from 
Bolívar to reunite Venezuela with Colombia by force produced distrust among his 
supporters in the United States.  Newspapers agreed with the Pennsylvania Inquisitor and 
began doubting Bolívar’s sincerity.  The Christian Advocate published, “[Bolívar] has 
certainly acted in a manner that must forever destroy, in our minds at least, all confidence 
in his integrity and his most solemn declarations.”120  Bolívar’s recent ambitions for 
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power and his delay in leaving the country caused many to continue questioning his 
values as a true republican.People in the U.S. still perceived a desire for authority in spite 
of his resignation. 
 
Death as Vindication: Not a Monarch but the Liberator 
 Despite what others saw as a “hankering for a crown,” Bolívar repeatedly 
defended himself as a fighter for freedom in the last years of his life.  In a letter to 
General Páez in March 1826, Bolívar confessed that a monarchy in South America did 
not make sense to him.  He believed “that this project is not good for you or for me or for 
the country.”  He clearly explained why he was not in favor of a monarchy in South 
America.  “Colombia has never been a monarchy.  A throne would be frightening as 
much for its height as for its brilliance.  Equality would be destroyed, and the people of 
color would see all their rights stripped away by a new aristocracy.” Bolívar did not want 
to take away the liberties he had fought for during the past two decades.  He was not 
Napoleon; he did not wish for a crown.  He was the great Liberator!  “Napoleon was a 
great and unique man, in addition to being extremely ambitious.  None of this applies 
here.  I am not Napoleon, nor do I wish to be.  Neither do I wish to imitate Caesar […].  
Such models seem unworthy of my glory.  The title of Liberator is superior to any ever 
granted to human pride.  Therefore, it is impossible to degrade it.”121  Bolívar felt he had 
attained such great glory as the Liberator that nothing could tempt him to tarnish that 
title.  Even if the United States saw Bolívar as a tyrant, he retained a conviction that he 
had done everything for the good of his country. 
                                                            





 Bolívar gave two proclamations to the Republic of Colombia which stood above 
the rest as bold refutations of his aspirations for a crown.  The first appeared in his 
resignation from all authority in January 1830.  He declared, “[A] crown which [… has 
been] offered me on more than one occasion and which I have rejected with the 
indignation of the fiercest republican.”  He adamantly rejoindered, “Never, never, I swear 
to you, has it crossed my mind to aspire to a kingship that my enemies have fabricated in 
order to ruin me in your regard.”  He then reassured his fellow countrymen of the motives 
for his actions. “Do not be deceived, Colombians!  My only desire has been to contribute 
to your freedom and to the preservation of your peace of mind.”122  In this proclamation, 
Bolívar denounced his supposed schemes for establishing a monarchy.  As he retired 
from public life, the famed general wanted Colombia to remember him only as the 
Liberator.   
He desired that Colombia and history preserve his glory, which became evident in 
his final proclamation to Colombia days before his death in December 1830.  
“Colombians!  You have been witness to my efforts to establish freedom where tyranny 
previously reigned.  I have worked without thought of personal gain, sacrificing my 
fortune and even my peace of mind.”  He explained why he continually renounced his 
political powers and how his enemies abused him.  “I relinquished my power when I 
became convinced that you mistrusted my detachment.  My enemies took advantage of 
your credulity and undermined what is most sacred to me: my reputation and my love of 
freedom.”  In an act of tragic heroism, he stated, “I have been the victim of my 
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persecutors, who have driven me to the very threshold of my grave.  I forgive them.”123  
Bolívar died only days later.  He never acquired a kingdom or an empire.  His death 
quieted many who questioned his actions and motives as the Liberator. 
 Bolívar died in December 1830 worn out from war and tuberculosis.  The Jackson 
administration retained a positive attitude toward General Bolívar even after the 
Liberator’s death.  Upon hearing the report of his death, U.S. Minister Moore wrote to the 
Minister of Foreign Relations of Colombia, Vicente Borrerro: “In the Liberator, 
Colombia has lost a benefactor and a father, society one of its most distinguished 
ornaments, the human race a skillful and successful defender of civil liberty….  His name 
is that of a patriot and hero; and although his exploits encompass a hemisphere his 
reputation has spread to all nations and will reach to the extremes of posterity.”124With 
these words, the Jackson administration sealed their notes on Bolívar and triumphed over 
the negative reports from the press. 
The news of Bolívar’s death did not arrive in the United States until February 
1831.  The newspapers reported on his death with mostly positive assesments.  The Niles’ 
Weekly Register editorialized,  
The time has not yet arrived for a just appreciation of the conduct and 
character of Simon Bolivar.  That he had much personal courage, and 
unconquerable perseverance, is manifest; and, until latterly, all men 
seemed to regard him as solemnly devoted to liberty and the rights of man.  
Some parts of his proceedings have appeared mysterious to us, […] and it 
was feared by many that he aimed at the sovereign power, and a crown. 
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[…] His value will be better estimated by the course of things that shall 
follow his death.125 
 
The Evening Post in New York observed in a short column:“Bolivar will be ranked as the 
greatest man, both as a statesman and soldier, who has hitherto appeared in the province 
of Spanish America, while his title to the reputation of a true and honest patriot, attested 
as it has been by numerous acts of his life, is now confirmed by his death.”126  This short 
statement set the tone for many newspaper reports on Bolivar’s passing.  The newspapers 
did not condemn the Liberator but desired to leave his legacy to the historians.  The 
article in the New-York Spectator read, “The character of Bolivar now belongs to history; 
and after the lapse of a generation, justice will be done to it, when interest and prejudice 
shall have become silent.  We will not presume to anticipate the verdict of posterity.”127 
 The final four years of Bolívar’s life proved to be the most controversial.  The 
U.S. perceived his actions as unrepublican, despotic, and imperialistic.  Popular 
understandings in the United States found it difficult to dismiss rumors of Bolívar’s 
monarchical leanings.  His dictatorships combined with the Bolivian Constitution created 
a period of disillusionment which endured until his death.  Despite the Jackson 
administration’s efforts to bolster Bolívar’s image, the Liberator’s death finally dispersed 
all doubts of his presumed unrepublican acts.  Though the U.S. continued to apply its 
conceptions of republicanism to Bolívar, it could not ignore the glory of his title. 
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RACE OVER REPUBLICANISM 
 
 
Race Theory in the Early United States 
 Since the time of colonization, the majority of Americans believed they were a 
chosen people of God.  Reginald Horsman wrote that this idea “permeated first the 
Puritan and then American thought.”128Prior to the nineteenth century, the race 
philosophies in the Enlightenment embraced environment as the reason for racial 
distinctions of the physical body.  Each race possessed the same mental aptitudes but 
regional and cultural differences “accounted for the marked gaps in achievement between 
different peoples and different nations.”129John Johnson argued that by 1815 people in 
the United States believed they “had become a super people, […] because of historically 
derived behavior patterns, sets of values, beliefs, attitudes, laws, customs, and physical 
characteristics that they associated with Anglo-Saxonism.”130  At this time, whites in 
North America began developing a connection to the European Anglo-Saxon race.  They 
believed Anglo-Saxons to be a superior race whose descendants created “free 
governments by means of a Revolution.”131 
 Aside from inheriting an assumed superiority of race and culture, North 
Americans also perpetuatedthe bias of the Black Legend.  This term did not appear until 
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the twentieth century but the Black Legend included all the degrading ideas Anglo-
Americans taught about the Spanish.  Accordingly, the Spanish were self-righteous, lazy, 
sanguinary, cruel, immoral, and superstitious.  They blindly followed the precepts of a 
corrupt clergy and treacherously honored the Inquisition.British publications and cultural 
bias propagated hostility toward Spain throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.132 
 Legalized slavery in the United States produced an atmosphere of natural 
superiority over the African race.  Horsman described this as the “American experience” 
which generated “scientific theories of black and Indian inferiority.”  This experience 
permitted pseudo-sciences to declare the “enhancement of the American Anglo-Saxon 
‘race’.”  New ideas of racial distinctions and polygenesis became popular due to the 
theories of pseudo-scientists.133  Johnson identified these new sciences as “catastrophism, 
craniology, phrenology, and the study of facial angle and hair texture.”  Both Johnson 
and Horsman argued that the growing popularity in the United States of the pseudo-
sciences were key to the development of racial ideologies during the early nineteenth 
century.134  These new ideologies stated that innate racial distinctions not environment 
generated the differences in skin color and in natural abilities.  These views put the 
Anglo-Saxon race on top placing blacks, Indians, and mixed breeds on bottom.  The new 
racial distinction theories became more accepted with “the widespread southern defense 
of slavery” and through the harsh racialized language used in the 1826 debates on the 
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Panama Congress.  By 1830, many recognized innate racial differences which produced a 
natural racial hierarchy.135 
 
Early Racial Attitudes Toward Spanish America 
The idea of enlightened superiority over Spanish Americans pervaded the 
attitudes of the leaders and citizens of the United States by the 1820s.  Animosity toward 
Spaniards continued to permeate the white North American culture.  During a session of 
Congress concerning the current state of the Spanish American provinces, Senator John 
Randolph from Virginia claimed that their struggle for independence would terminate in 
“a detestable despotism.”  He argued, “You cannot make liberty out of Spanish matter 
[…].  What ideas had the Spaniards of rational liberty […]?  None.”136Thomas Jefferson 
echoed Randolph’s negative assessment in a letter to John Adams in 1818, “They [the 
South Americans] will succeed against Spain.  But the dangerous enemy is within their 
own breasts.  Ignorance and superstition will chain their minds and bodies under religious 
and military despotism.  I do believe it would be better for them to obtain freedom by 
degrees only.”137  In a later correspondence to Adams, Jefferson expressed his fears of 
South American independence: “I feared from the beginning, that these people were not 
yet sufficiently enlightened for self-government; and that after wading through blood and 
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slaughter, they would end in military tyrannies, more or less numerous.”138  Jefferson and 
Randolph represented the fears of the United States at this time: military despotismand 
the Black Legend prevented Spanish Americans to establish concrete republics. 
John Quincy Adams held many views toward the peoples of South America 
which opposed their becoming independent states.  Early on, he questioned Bolívar’s 
tactics in emancipating Venezuelan slaves.  In response to “Bolívar’s decree freeing those 
slaves who fought under the patriot banner,” Adams wondered “whether the cause of 
Venezuela is precisely the same as ours was.”139He retained certain reservations about 
Bolívar based on his ideals of equality and the stratified society in which he lived.  
Adams saw the United States as an enlightened model of republicanism which did not 
free their slaves but allowed the states to decide the matter. He wrote in his diary on 
September 19, 1820, “As to an Americansystem, we have it; we constitute the whole of 
it; there is no community of interests or of principles between North and South America. 
[…] Bolivar [… talks] about an American system […], but there is no basis for any such 
system.”140 
Less than a year later, Adams explained his sentiments about South America and 
their struggle for liberty.  He stated, “So far as they were contending for independence, I 
wished well to their cause; but I had seen and yet see no prospect that they would 
establish free or liberal institutions of government.”  He desired their independence from 
Spain as long as they formed a republican government which mirrored the virtues and 
morals of the United States’ government.  Adams did not believe that South Americans 
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could organize such a liberal institution.  “They have not the first elements of good or 
free government.  Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their 
education, upon their habits, and upon all their institutions.  […] War and mutual 
destruction was in every member of their organization, moral, political, and physical.”141  
Adams retained no hope for the people of Spanish America.  He regarded their cultural 
weaknesses which they had inherited from Spain as too pervasive to overcome. 
By the 1820s, North American whites considered the creoles and mixed races in 
South America as inferior to them.  The different races in the Spanish America “inherited 
the least desirable attributes” from their progenitors.142U.S. diplomats to northern South 
America reported on the perceived frailties of these races.  Their observations reflected 
fears that Spanish Americans were not ready for self-government.  Robert K. Lowry, 
Consul at La Guayra, Venezuela, from 1810 until 1826, reported on the complacency of 
the people even after the U.S. officially recognized the Republic of Colombia:  “I shall 
content myself with saying that this People is ill prepared for the Rights of Civil Liberty, 
and that the leave of Spanish Despotism, has infected their present Rulers, as much as it 
ever did their former master.”143Charles S. Todd, a confidential agent of the U.S. from 
1820 to 1824, provided Secretary Adams with a description of the current political state 
in the Republic of Colombia:  “Under the imposing aspect of a Representative Republic, 
all the regulations, prejudices and caprices of the Spanish System really prevail.”  Todd, 
like others, passed his derogatory attitudes toward Spain onto the people of the new 
republics.  “[Until] the people shall be prepared by a radical reformation in their habits 
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and degree of intelligence, it cannot be expected that they can realize an efficient 
Government emanating from the periodical Will of the Mass of the 
Community.”144Agents perceived an inability of South Americans to relate to the 
principles of democracy found in the United States.  Some agreed with Jefferson that 
Spanish Americans had to take gradual steps toward freedom, “and in some cases 
imperceptible [progress].”145 
 
The Panama Question: Congressional Debates and Race 
 In 1825, the United States received an invitation to take part in a congress in 
Panama.  Bolívar planned the Panama Congress originally for the new Spanish republics 
to with the hope of forming a larger union in the future.  At first he did not wish the U.S. 
to be part of the congress, but after his vice-president sent an invitation to them he 
confessed, “I am also pleased that the United States is sending an envoy to the Isthmus, 
no matter what the terms.”146  Though Bolívar appeared satisfied, there were some in the 
U.S. Congress who did not want to be a part of the conference.  By the time of the 
debates, reports had reached the government of Bolívar’s ambition and possible plans for 
an empire. Aside from Bolívar’s ambition, many knew that the republics granted equality 
to everyone regardless of race.  The liberation ofevery slave who fought for the 
republican cause produced a large number of free blacks within these republics.147  In 
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1823, before the need to consider the Panama Congress, Senator William Smith declared, 
“I should not prefer an intimate connection with these people, until they should first have 
given us some proofs of a national character favourable to our southern institutions.”148 
The debates in Congress on sending delegates to the Panama Congress began in 
March 1826.  Jaede wrote of the apprehensions some congressmen felt toward sending 
delegates: “Many Southerners feared participation in the Panama Congress because of 
realities of race relations and emancipation in Spanish America.”149The opposition to the 
Panama Congress did not have enough votes on their side to prevent 
sendingrepresentatives.  So they debated in order to delay the decision.  The opposition 
prolonged the decision attempting to avoid participation in a congress where they 
assumed “that antislavery measures would be adopted.Congressmen presumed that many 
of the representatives from the other countries would be of African descent or be of a 
mixed race.150  They argued that liberal race ideologies and mixing in Spanish America 
prevented hemisphere cooperation.151Representative W.C. Rives of Viriginiaproclaimed, 
“I do not believe there ever can be any cordial fraternity between us and them.  The 
difference of origin, of blood, of physical and moral constitution, of language, of manners 
and customs, of religion, as they preclude any congeniality of feelings, must impose 
insuperable impediments to any intimate political union.”152  According to Rives, innate 
racial distinctions prevented any agreement on points relating to culture and policy. 
                                                            
148As quoted in Fitz, Our Sister Republics, 233. 
149Jaede, Brothers at a Distance, 161-163. 
150 Johnson, A Hemisphere Apart, 76, see also Jaede, Brothers at a Distance, 157-158. 
151 Ibid., 177. 




Opposition members then turned to the question of emancipation.  They believed 
that the United States would be the only country represented which hadn’t emancipated 
their slaves.153Mr. Benton, a senator from Missouri, asked concerning the possible 
question of universal emancipation, “Who are to advise and sit in judgment upon it?  Five 
nations who have already put the black man upon an equality with the white, not only in 
their constitutions but in real life; five nations who have at this moment (at least some of 
them) black Generals in their armies, and mulatto Senators in their Congresses!”154  
Benton and others argued that sending delegates to the congress would force them to 
accept any votes on emancipation due to their minority vote.Johnson wrote that in these 
debates, “creole leaders were harshly attacked as Negrophiles for supporting the 
emancipation of Afro-Americans and for recognizing all racial groups as equal before the 
law.”155The opposition no longer saw Spanish Americans as republicans following the 
model of the United States.  Instead, it viewed them through a lens of racial distinctions 
due to the delicacy of the question regarding slavery in the U.S.  Any form of supporting 
the Panama Mission threatened the livelihood of the Southerners.  However, the 
opposition felt that one item of the Panama Congress also threatened American lives. 
The agenda for the Panama Congress included planning the invasion and 
liberation of Cuba and Puerto Rico – both of which held an “immense negro population” 
– anddiscussing “the diplomatic status of Haiti.”156Concerning Haitian recognition, 
Congress agreed, “Our policy, with regard to Hayti [sic], is plain.  We never can 
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acknowledge her independence.”157The possible invasion of Cuba made up the central 
factor to the opposition’s argument.Congressmen feared that an invasion of Cuba would 
create another black republic.  They believed that the black republics in the Caribbean 
would unite and lead an assault on the southern United States where slavery still 
existed.158An attack would encourage enslaved blacks to foment an insurrection where 
the white population “will chiefly be put to death.”159Since the Panama Congress 
threatened slavery, it in turn endangered the lives of southern families.  James Buchanan 
– Representative from Pennsylvania – asked, “Is there any man in this Union, who could, 
for one moment, indulge the horrid idea of abolishing slavery, by the massacre of the 
high-minded, and the chivalrous race of men in the South? I trust there is not one.”  After 
bringing the perceived threat to the forefront, he followed, “For my own part I would, 
without hesitation, buckle on my knapsack, and march in company with my friend from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Everett) in defence [sic] of their cause.”160  Opponents to sending 
delegates to the Panama Congress did not always come from the south.  Many 
Northerners stood by their southern brothers and also employed racialized language to 
strengthen their arguments and delay the decision. 
 Newspapers reprinted the speeches from the Congressional Debates on the 
Panama Question of 1826.  Concerning the editors of these papers, Fitz 
wrote,“[Whatever] position they took, one thing was clear: race was becoming more 
prominent in reports about South America.”161Jaede illustrated that both parties in the 
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debate spoke of the issue of race.  “[The] majority of congressional speakers emphasized 
what was bad, foreign and dangerous about Latin America and Latin Americans.  Not 
only opponents but also supporters of the mission agreed that the US and Latin America 
had distinct natures and interests.”162  Overt racial language resulted from the discussions 
on the Panama Congress.  The words of politicians struck true with some of the editors in 
the United States.  Even Niles, a defender of the Spanish American provinces, expressed 
in 1826, “That moral power which with us is superior even to the law, can hardly be said 
to exist in some of these new states ...”163  One article went as far as claiming that, “True 
Americans, the author [of an editorial on the Panama question] insisted, were 
white.”164The Congressional debates on the Panama Mission heightened public 
awareness of racial distinctions with hemispheric relations. Combined with the 
“American Experience,” dispatches from diplomats in South America, and theories of 
pseudo-scientists, the debates accelerated the slow-paced growth of the evolving 
ideologies of innate racial differences which put white Anglo-Saxon on top.  By 1830, 
many in the United States accepted the new theories of racial distinctions and superiority.
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Over Bolívar’s lifetime, views from the United States alternated between hero and 
dictator, republican and monarch, disinterested and ambitious, as well as through racial 
and nonracial terms.  Jaede summed up reasons why the U.S. saw South Americans 
through a lens of republicanism.  “To most North Americans, Spanish America looked 
like ‘us’: in our place, of our time, advancing our cause, and on our side in both the 
mundane and the cosmic contests of the day.  North Americans counted their neighbors 
as presumptive allies against the ‘Old World’ of monarchy, ignorance, trade restrictions 
and oppression.”165 Diplomats to northern South America retained this view and 
promoted republicanism as part of U.S. policy at the time.166Rippy explained that these 
“witnesses” held “strong political prejudices” and “believed that the federal democratic 
republic was the best” form of government.  In other words, these diplomats did not 
accept that Bolívar could maintain a preference for “a centralized and aristocratic system” 
over a liberal republican government.167Due to Bolívar’s preference for a European 
solution for South American governance, the press began to label him a dictator, tyrant, 
and despot.168Many in the U.S. eventually concluded “that people are not by nature 
republicans.”169 
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 The faltering enthusiasm for Bolívar – based on his ambition and the political 
unrest in South America – coincidedwith the development of race relations within the 
United States.  Both Fitz and Jaede pinpointed the debates of 1826 on the Panama 
Congress as a turning point in the way the U.S. viewed Spanish America.  They agreed 
that the reality of race relations within the United States caused the U.S. to see South 
Americans as racially distinct and inferior.170Jaedeillustrated the emerging racial ideology 
in the United States: “the Anglophone world of the early nineteenth century was 
beginning to define national groups in racial terms, and to invent the notion of a superior 
‘Anglo-Saxon race.’”171 
 Racial distinctions actually developed overtime in the United States.  In the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries public figures and commentators preached an 
emphasis on U.S. superiority as a direct result of white North American ancestry ofthe 
Anglo-Saxon race.  In 1789, Jedidiah Morse described the people of the U.S. in his 
geography as “Anglo-Americans.”172 Relations between the United States and the new 
Spanish American provincesincluded evidence of a natural superiority over mixed 
races,which inherited the negative perceptions of the Black Legend. As early as 1812, 
diplomats reported their beliefs on the lack of “virtue and morality” and ignorance as “a 
prevailing feature in the character of the people.”  Jaede and Fitz correctly point out that 
the debates in 1826 concerning the Panama Congress produced explicit racial language 
pertaining to the United States’ relationship with South Americans.  However, these 
debates derived from already emerging opinions based on race.  The press readily 
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published copies of these speeches which directly influenced U.S. popular notions of 
race.  Publications from the emerging pseudo-sciences reasserted the racialized language 
contained in the debates on the Panama Mission.  According to Horsman, the theory of 
innate racial differences gained widespread acceptance in the U.S. by the 1830s.173 
A scholar of relations between Latin America and the United States, Fredrick 
Pike, best synthesized the stance of the U.S. toward Bolívar based on prevalent racial 
conceptions.  Dealing with what he called “American perceptions of truth,” Pike wrote,  
Incapable of subjecting his own passions to control even as he fought for 
independence, Bolívar in the course of the struggle liberated outward 
symbols of passion and primitivism: he freed the slaves of Latin America 
[…] and established a close alliance with the tumultuous blacks and 
mulattoes of Haiti […].  Washington had the sense […] to retain his slaves 
[… and], unlike Bolívar, Washington did not entertain utopian dreams 
about the speedy incorporation of Indians into the political and social 
mainstream.174 
 
This perception of Bolívar demonstrated the developing racial distinctions in the U.S. 
between Anglo and Spanish Americans.  Pike portrayed Bolívar’s characteristics as a 
deterrence to the overall success of establishing a secure democracy among the 
adolescent nations of South America.  Many in the U.S. believed these traits prevented 
Bolívar from achieving the same glory as Washington. 
Juan Vicente González once wrote, “With the majestic qualities of Bolívar, 
Washington would have awakened fears among the fervent puritans of the North; with 
the modest virtues of Washington, Bolívar would not have advanced by one day the 
cause of Independence in the South.”175  To gain its independence from Spain, Spanish 
America required a hero like General Bolívar.  Months before his death, Bolívar to a 
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friend, “Posterity will do me justice, and an assurance of this is all I possess to make me 
happy.  My best intentions have been construed to the worst of motives; and, in the 
United States, where I expected justice, I have been abused.”176The U.S. continually 
projected its ideals of republicanism and its notions of power onto Bolívar.  Instead of 
conceptualizing what may be best for Spanish Americans, interpretations of Bolívar’s 
actions in the U.S. created disillusionment with the republicanism of South Americans. 
In short, the United States saw Bolivar as a republican fighting against the tyranny 
of a monarch.  The U.S. interpreted South Americans’ struggles as a similar cause as its 
own a few decades prior.   At first, the U.S. applauded Bolívar for his acts of heroism and 
republicanism.  Many granted him the title of the “Washington of South America.”  As 
the U.S. became more aware of Bolívar’s ambition, ties of brotherhood and sisterhood to 
Spanish America began to deteriorate.  Bolivar wanted a strong, central – possibly 
autocratic – government that educated its citizens in civic virtue and proper moral codes.  
He sought to establish a government which suited the needs of South Americans and gave 
liberty to any person regardless of race.177Emerging definitions of race and the 
“Anglophone world” overlapped the rifts already forming between the United States and 
South America.  Many in the U.S began to see the republics of South America as a 
growing threat to the institution of slavery and Bolívar as a “traitor to liberty.”  Only the 
death of the Liberator and the continuance of republican governments in Spanish 
America quieted the doubters.  Though his contemporaries misconceived his motives, 
Bolívar’s life left a legacy stillglorified to this day.  
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